Preserving the Civil Jury Right: Reconsidering the Scope of the Seventh Amendment by Czerwien, Joseph
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 65 | Issue 2
2014
Preserving the Civil Jury Right: Reconsidering the
Scope of the Seventh Amendment
Joseph Czerwien
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Joseph Czerwien, Preserving the Civil Jury Right: Reconsidering the Scope of the Seventh Amendment, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 429 (2014)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol65/iss2/7
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
429 
—  Note  — 
Preserving the Civil Jury Right: 
Reconsidering the Scope of the 
Seventh Amendment 
Contents 
 
Introduction .................................................................................................. 429 
I.  The Current Historical Test .......................................................... 430 
A.  The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment ........ 430 
B.  English Courts, American Courts, and the Civil Jury ........................ 435 
II.  The Limitations of the Current Application of the 
Historical Test .................................................................................. 442 
A.  Reconciling the Historical Record with the Historical Test ............... 442 
B.  The Public Rights Exception’s Development .................................... 445 
III.  Proposing a New Test for the Seventh Amendment’s 
Scope ...................................................................................................... 449 
A.  The New Test—What It Is and What It Covers............................... 449 
B.  Implementing the New Test and Maintaining Efficient Proceedings ... 454 
1. The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections ............... 455 
2. Tailoring the Civil Jury Right to Fit Administrative 
Adjudication ................................................................................ 457 
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 459 
Introduction 
The Seventh Amendment provides that “[i]n Suits at common 
law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”1 To 
determine whether the amendment provides a jury right, a court must 
examine the nature of the action and the remedy sought.2 If the 
nature and remedy would historically have required a jury trial, then 
the amendment provides for a jury right.3 This so-called “historical 
test” requires a court to investigate eighteenth-century causes of 
 
1. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
2. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) 
(“First, we compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions 
brought in the courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law 
and equity. Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine 
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”). 
3. Id. 
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action and procedure, but the federal courts have largely applied it 
without much difficulty.4 
Despite this relatively straightforward test, many commentators 
have challenged the current historically rooted test. There is no 
consensus on what, exactly, is wrong with the test, nor is there 
agreement on what test should take its place. This Note argues that 
the Court’s historical test is in keeping with the amendment’s scope 
and purpose. The amendment was written to limit the government’s 
power to remove cases from a jury, thus preserving civil parties’ right 
to receive a jury trial. By requiring an inquiry into the eighteenth-
century common law, the historical test does serve that purpose. The 
Court should reexamine the scope of the amendment, however, as 
there is some historical evidence to suggest that “suits at common 
law” means all suits which were not properly of equity or admiralty. 
Defining “suits at common law” in the negative, it follows that the 
original scope of the Seventh Amendment is broad enough to cover 
new types of actions, which have no historical analog in the 
eighteenth century.5 The Court has stated that new cases, dealing 
with “public rights,” need not be heard by juries. This “public rights 
exception” is inconsistent with the amendment’s purpose. This Note 
will examine the historical foundation for the amendment and propose 
a reworking of the Court’s understanding for the Seventh Amendment 
and the public rights exception. This proposal will not remove the 
exception entirely but will provide a framework for courts to 
distinguish those cases where the Seventh Amendment does apply, 
regardless of forum. In those forums that currently lack a jury, this 
Note will advance some suggestions for maintaining efficient and 
effective adjudication.  
I. The Current Historical Test 
A. The Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Seventh Amendment 
The central difficulty surrounding the amendment has been 
determining what civil jury right is “preserved.”6 Some have suggested  
4. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 
U.S. 687, 707–09 (1999) (analogizing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to an 
eighteenth-century suit in tort); FTC v. Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 
66–67 (2d Cir. 2006) (determining, in one paragraph, that the Seventh 
Amendment does not cover the remedy sought). 
5. See Parsons v. Bedford et al., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830) (“In a 
just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all 
suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may 
be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.”). 
6. See, e.g., Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 166 (1973) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (“Some 30 years ago, Mr. Justice Black warned his Brethren 
against the ‘gradual process of judicial erosion which . . . has slowly 
worn away a major portion of the essential guarantee of the Seventh 
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that the amendment’s language refers to the court practices of the 
states.7 Such an interpretation would be unduly complex and lead to 
numerous difficulties. The amendment requires some level of historical 
analysis, but the amount required has been the subject of debate for 
decades. Even some members of the Supreme Court have noted that 
too rigid a historical approach “may seem to reek unduly of the study, 
‘if not of the museum.’”8 
The word “preserved” has been generally considered to refer to 
the common law of England. In United States v. Wonson, 9 Justice 
Story, then riding circuit, took up the issue. That case reached the 
court on appeal, but the appellant conceded that the trial court had 
not made any reversible errors. 10  Rather than challenge an error 
below, the appellant sought a new trial by jury at the circuit court 
level.11 Wonson, then, implicated the Seventh Amendment’s guarantee 
that “no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the 
common law.”12 Story concluded that the amendment did not refer to 
“the common law of any individual state, (for it probably differs in 
all)” but to “the common law of England, the grand reservoir of all 
our jurisprudence.”13 By this interpretation, the right to a jury trial 
existed in those cases where an English court would have impaneled a 
jury. Thus, the meaning of the word “preserved” in the amendment 
was explained, and the right was preserved as it had been in England.  
 
Amendment.’ Today, the erosion process reaches bedrock.” (quoting 
Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397 (1943) (Black, J. dissent-
ing)); see also Joan E. Schaffner, The Seventh Amendment Right to 
Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court 
Taketh Away, 31 U. Balt. L. Rev. 225, 228 (2002) (“In its analysis of 
Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the Court . . . carefully ‘preserves’ 
the basic right to jury over the cause of action. However, at the same 
time, the Court denigrates that right by finding few incidents of the jury 
right fundamental to the essence of the trial by jury . . . .”). 
7. See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh 
Amendment, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639, 732–34 (1973) (discussing the 
interpretation that a federal court looks to the state in which it sits for 
guidance on the scope of the civil jury right). 
8. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 232 
(2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Damsky v. 
Zavatt, 289 F. 2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1961)).  
9. 28 F. Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750) (Story, Circuit 
Justice). 
10. Id. at 747. 
11. Id. 
12. U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
13. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. at 750. 
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The Supreme Court defined the scope of the right eighteen years 
later in Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove, & Robeson.14 Once again, 
Justice Story took up the task of interpreting the amendment. Suits 
at common law, he explained, meant those suits that were distin-
guishable from suits in equity or admiralty.15 Suits at common law 
involved “legal rights,” in distinction from suits over “equitable rights 
alone.”16 Thus, the Court set the bounds of the Seventh Amend-
ment—the civil jury right is implicated when a legal right is at issue. 
In Wonson and Breedlove, Story determined what would eventually 
become the Court’s “historical test” for Seventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. A court considers the nature of a case and the remedy sought; 
if the nature and remedy have analogs in eighteenth-century common 
law jurisprudence, a court will generally follow the procedure of the 
eighteenth-century court. The remedy is the more important element 
of the test.17 
The Court has followed this test into the present day, providing 
additional guidance along the way. For example, the Court has 
cautioned that legal claims should only rarely be subordinate to 
equitable claims.18 This would, as the Court noted, mean that it is 
uncommon for equitable issues to preclude a jury trial on any legal 
rights.19 Thus, a case involving both legal and equitable claims will 
often require a jury trial. 
Additionally, the Court has held that the right to a jury trial 
extends to new causes of action beyond those found in eighteenth-
century English courts. For example, in Curtis v. Loether,20 the Court 
considered whether a suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 
implicated the right to a jury trial. That case involved a statutory 
right with no clear historical analog in eighteenth-century common 
law. Quoting the court of appeals with approval, the Court stated 
that “we have considered the applicability of the constitutional right 
to jury trial in actions enforcing statutory rights ‘as a matter too 
 
14. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830). 
15. Id. at 446–47. 
16. Id. at 447. 
17. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 421 (1987). 
18. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959) (“[A] 
long-standing principle of equity dictates that only under the most 
imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible 
procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now anticipate, can the right 
to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of 
equitable claims.”). 
19. Id. at 510–11. 
20. 415 U.S. 189 (1974). 
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obvious to be doubted.’”21 The Court also reaffirmed the distinction of 
Parsons—that the phrase “suits at common law” was meant to 
“embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty 
jurisdiction . . . .”22 
The Court has recognized that the Seventh Amendment did not 
freeze the jury right as it existed in 1791. The test relies on historical 
analogies to determine when the amendment applies, rather than 
requiring strict historical parallels.23 The Court follows a two-part test 
to determine whether a case involves a suit at common law. A court 
is to consider (1) whether there is a historically analogous cause of 
action in eighteenth-century English common law, and (2) whether 
the remedy sought is legal or equitable.24 For this analysis, the remedy 
prong is more important than the historical analogy.25  
Even when a case implicates the right to a jury trial, the Court 
has recognized exceptions for procedural issues. If the case involves a 
suit at common law, a court next determines whether the substance of 
the right requires a jury trial on the particular issue.26 A judge may 
determine a question of law,27 or a procedural issue,28 without implica-
ting the right to a civil jury trial. The Court has suggested that the 
 
21. Id. at 193 (quoting Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 
1972).  
22. Id. at 192–93 (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, Breedlove, & Robeson, 
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
23. See, e.g., id. at 193 (“Although the thrust of the Amendment was to 
preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been 
settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action 
recognized at that time.”). 
24. See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987) (“First, we 
compare the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the 
courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and 
equity. . . . Second, we examine the remedy sought and determine 
whether it is legal or equitable in nature.”). 
25. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989). 
26. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) 
(“If the action in question belongs in the law category, we then ask 
whether the particular trial decision must fall to the jury in order to 
preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in 1791.”).  
27. See, e.g., id. at 388–90 (holding that because patent construction would 
be better settled by judges than juries, it will be treated as an issue of 
law rather than fact). 
28. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943) (holding 
that the Seventh Amendment “was designed to preserve the basic 
institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental elements, not the 
great mass of procedural forms and details . . . .”). 
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practical limitations of juries were a consideration, but it has not 
explicitly included this in its analysis.29 
The Court has recognized an exception for public rights.30 When 
Congress creates a public right by statute, it may delegate the 
adjudication of a claim involving that right to a forum not governed 
by Article III.31 Congress, then, has the discretion to create a new 
forum and to determine whether a jury is required.32 This exception is 
invoked in numerous cases, including bankruptcy proceedings and 
administrative actions.33 
While the public rights exception is consistent with the bound-
aries of Article III, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Seventh 
Amendment. Commentators have proposed solutions to the inter-
pretive inconsistencies—from the strictly historical34 to the practical.35 
This Note argues that the right to a civil jury does apply in those 
cases heard in non–Article III courts. This understanding has a signifi-
cant impact on the public rights exception. 
In the centuries since Wonson, courts have treated the Seventh 
Amendment as preserving the civil jury in those cases where it would 
 
29. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (“As our cases indicate, 
the ‘legal’ nature of an issue is determined by considering, first, the pre-
merger custom with reference to such questions; second, the remedy 
sought; and, third, the practical abilities and limitations of juries.”).  
30. A public right is a statutory cause of action arising from and closely 
related to a federal regulatory scheme. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 
54–55. 
31. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 449–50 (1977) (holding that in public-rights 
cases, Congress may delegate “the factfinding function . . . to an 
administrative forum with which the jury would be incompatible.”). 
32. See id. 
33. See generally Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial 
Power: From Murray’s Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 Buff. L. 
Rev. 765 (1986) (discussing the public rights exception in non–Article 
III courts). 
34. See James Oldham, Trial by Jury: The Seventh Amendment and 
Anglo-American Special Juries 15 (2006) (“The Seventh Amend-
ment historical test has become an American legal fiction in application, 
since many more things were lodged with juries in England in 1791 than 
modern American courts . . . .”); see also Martin H. Redish, Seventh 
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of 
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 486, 489 (1975) 
(“[B]ecause jury trial is inefficient, we should employ a strictly historical 
test.”). 
35. See Joseph A. Miron Jr., Note, The Constitutionality of a Complexity 
Exception to the Seventh Amendment, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 865 
(1998) (arguing that a complexity exception is consistent with the 
Seventh Amendment’s historical test). 
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have been granted under English common law. This approach does 
have some advantages. First, the states were not uniform in their 
legal regimes. Second, many more treatises deal with English common 
law of that time period and lastly England had a longer record of trial 
practice for courts to examine.  
There are, however, some important differences between the 
English common law right and the colonial American understanding 
of the right to a jury trial in civil cases. While this Note does not 
argue that the term “suits at common law” requires a federal court to 
follow specific state procedure, this Note does contend that the 
amendment refers to a broader understanding of the common law 
right to a jury trial in civil cases. This distinction can be seen by 
comparing historical English practice with the courts of the early 
American republic. 
B. English Courts, American Courts, and the Civil Jury 
The English courts’ relationship with civil juries is a long one, 
though hardly consistent. The use of juries emerged in the early 
English courts.36 Yet, the English court system was complex. Only 
courts of common law could impanel juries; courts of equity and local 
“courts of conscience” operated without juries.37  
These court systems did interact at times. Edward Coke noted 
that the chancery court, in some circumstances, must return cases to 
a common law court for trial by jury on the issues.38 Some cases were 
appropriately heard only in courts of common law, when those courts 
alone could grant an adequate remedy. Thus, law and equity had 
some overlap, although they were largely treated as separate systems. 
William Blackstone remarked that there was significant overlap 
between the courts of common law and equity.39 Fraud, accident, and 
trust actions could properly be brought in a court of equity, but many 
of those same cases could also be brought in a court of common law.40 
 
36. See Oldham, supra note 34, at 3 (noting that the “modern model of 
trial by jury” developed in England in the sixteenth century). 
37. John H. Langbein et al., History of the Common Law: The 
Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 459–62 
(2009) (quoting Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in 
Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J. Legal Hist. 253, 260 (2005)). 
38. Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws 
of England: Concerning the Jurisdiction of Courts 79 (1809). 
39. 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *429–30 (1803) (“Whereas 
every definition or illustration to be met with, which now draws a line 
between the two jurisdictions, by setting law and equity in opposition to 
each other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to a 
certain degree.”). 
40. See id. at *431–32. 
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The essential difference between the two courts was procedural.41 
Thus, a case could potentially be brought in either court, so long as 
the plaintiff was able to convince the judge that the forum was 
appropriate. 
The jurisdiction of English courts of equity had gradually 
expanded over time.42 Blackstone noted with approval how courts of 
equity had expanded beyond hearing “rare and extraordinary 
matters.”43 Still, plaintiffs in a court of equity were required to at 
least state that they were without relief in a court of common law.44 
And in the court of chancery, any factual issues to be resolved were 
sent to the Court of the King’s Bench for a jury trial.45 While it would 
be several decades before the civil jury trial fell out of favor,46 many 
English courts were designed and expected to function without juries. 
Even when English courts used a jury, the jury had a limited role. 
For example, jury nullification was not generally favored in England’s 
courts. Although commentators like Blackstone praised the jury 
system,47 jurors who acted on their own accord could find themselves 
in trouble with the judges presiding over the cases. One seventeenth-
century jury was fined and imprisoned for failing to change its verdict 
 
41. Id. at *436 (“[The difference] principally consists in the different modes 
of administering justice in each; in the mode of proof, the mode of trial, 
and the mode of relief.”). 
42. Id. at *437 (“[F]or want of this discovery at law, the courts of equity 
have acquired a concurrent jurisdiction with every other court in all 
matters of account.”). 
43. Id. at *440 (quoting William Lambard) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
44. Id. at *442 (noting that plaintiffs in equity must demonstrate that they 
were “wholly without remedy at the common law”). 
45. Id. at *452 (“[A]s no jury can be summoned to attend this court, the 
fact is usually directed to be tried at the bar of the court of king’s 
bench.”). 
46. See Langbein et al., supra note 37, at 461 (“By the end of the 1840s 
and across the 1850s . . . hostility toward the civil jury trial became a 
recurring theme in the legal journals.”). 
47. See Blackstone, supra note 39, at *379 (“Upon these accounts the 
trial by jury ever has been, and I trust ever will be, looked upon as the 
glory of the English law.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Preserving the Civil Jury Right 
437 
after the court ordered it to reconsider.48 Although it was not the 
norm, this was hardly a unique experience.49 
Story’s observation that England is “the grand reservoir of all our 
jurisprudence”50 is, no doubt, correct. The federal court system, like 
the state court systems, derived much of its procedure and law from 
the English common law. There is reason to believe, however, that the 
attitudes toward civil juries were different in the early United States. 
At the time, the common law was not considered an inherited legal 
tradition from England but a “form of universal natural law.”51 Those 
who believed that the “common law was derived from the law of 
nature and of revelation”52 would not have hesitated to break from 
English tradition when they believed that the English court system 
was incorrect.  
The distinction between the two views first arose in the decades 
before the Revolution. In the states, the right to a jury trial was 
considered one of the natural rights of all people. It was no accident 
that the right to a jury appears in “a conspicuous place” in many 
early state constitutions and declarations.53 By the time the Bill of 
Rights was written, American jurisprudence had developed an 
enlarged view of the role of jurors in the court system. It is that view 
that was “preserved” in the Seventh Amendment. 
Some of the first grievances about civil jury trials came with the 
Sugar Act of 1764,54 the Stamp Act of 1765,55 and the Townshend  
48. See John Proffatt, A Treatise on Trial by Jury, Including 
Questions of Law and Fact 56 (1877). The fines and charges were 
subsequently overruled, but this was not an isolated case of punishing 
jurors. See id. at 55–57 (detailing other cases in which the jury was 
intimidated to change its verdict). 
49. See Langbein et al., supra note 37, at 419–39 (detailing English 
courts’ attempts to sway jury verdicts and, if all else failed, punishment 
of the jury). 
50. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (Story, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 16,750). 
51. Calvin Woodard, Is the United States a Common Law Country?, in 
Essays on English Law and the American Experience 120, 127 
(Elisabeth A. Cawthon & David E. Narrett eds., 1994).  
52. Jesse Root, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Superior Court 
and Supreme Court of Errors from July, a.d. 1789 to June, 
a.d. 1793, at iv (1798). Root goes on to state that “[w]e need only 
compare the laws of England with the laws of Connecticut, to be at 
once convinced of the difference which pervades their whole system. 
This is manifest in . . . the forms of civil processes, and the mode of 
trial, the appointing and returning jurors.” Id. at viii. 
53. Proffatt, supra note 48, at 121. 
54. 4 Geo. 3, c. 15 (1764), reprinted in Prologue to Revolution: 
Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766, at 
4–8 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). 
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Acts of 1767.56 These acts expanded the jurisdiction of admiralty 
courts, which had no juries.57 This prompted action by the colonists. 
Nine of the thirteen colonies formed the Stamp Act Congress, which 
declared that “by extending the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty 
beyond its ancient limits, [the acts] have a manifest tendency to 
subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.”58 The Pennsylvania 
Assembly separately noted that “Authority in the Courts of Admir-
alty to decide in Suits relating to the Stamp Duty” did violence to 
“one of their most darling and acknowledged Rights, that of Trial by 
Juries.”59  
The colonists reacted strongly because they saw juries as an 
important factor in a more representative government. John Adams 
noted that principles of popular government meant that a jury had as 
much a final say on the law as a judge.60 This frustrated the colonial 
governors, who found that the jurors often disapproved of the laws 
and voted accordingly.61 But the idea that juries could change or 
ignore the law, regardless of the judge’s opinion, was an important 
part of the early American notion of justice. 
A decade after the Sugar and Stamp Acts, the states began 
drafting their own constitutions. The right to a civil jury was an 
important feature in many. Georgia’s constitution provided that “[t]he 
jury shall be judges of law, as well as of fact.” 62  Pennsylvania 
provided for the right to a jury trial “in controversies respecting 
property, and in suits between man and man.” 63  Massachusetts 
provided for a jury trial in all cases except for those where a jury had 
 
55. 5 Geo. 3, c. 12 (1765), reprinted in Prologue to Revolution: 
Sources and Documents on the Stamp Act Crisis, 1764–1766, at 
35–43 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). 
56. 7 Geo. 3, c. 41, 46 (1767). 
57. Langbein et al., supra note 37, at 483. 
58. Id. 
59. Pa. Assemb., Resolves on the Stamp Act § 8 (1765), reprinted in Pro-
logue to Revolution: Sources and Documents on the Stamp 
Act Crisis, 1764–1766, at 51–52 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1959). 
60. See Langbein et al., supra note 37, at 483–84 (quoting Adams as 
supporting juries having “as complete a control” over the law as judges). 
61. Id. at 480–82 (discussing Erving v. Cradock, a case in which the jury 
explicitly ignored the judge’s instructions to enter a verdict for the 
defendant). 
62. Ga. Const. of 1778, art. XLI. 
63. Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XI (“[I]n controversies respecting property, 
and in suits between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by 
jury, which ought to be held sacred.”). 
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not been previously used.64 By contrast, New York required a jury 
only in “cases in which it hath heretofore been used.” 65  Thus, 
Massachusetts’s constitution restricted the type of juryless cases, 
whereas New York’s constitution prevented the expansion of the right 
to a civil jury. This meant that the states would inevitably vary in 
their treatment of those cases in the middle ground—new types of 
cases that had not been previously litigated in the states. All the 
same, even those states that continued to mirror the English court 
system noted in their constitutions that the jury trial was an 
important right.66 
It follows that the early state court systems varied widely. In 
some states, all cases were tried by jury;67 others followed the English 
model.68 Even in those states that had juryless equity proceedings, 
some historians have suggested that actions in equity were still very 
limited.69 This contrasts with England, where cases in courts of equity 
were becoming more common. As one scholar has noted, the 
American legal system was a mix of English common law and 
“indigenous colonial product.”70 
Records from the Constitution’s drafting reveal that the civil jury 
trial was not one of the prominent issues discussed at the 
convention.71 When the delegates did discuss civil jury trials, one 
delegate pointed out the obvious difficulty: “The jury cases cannot be 
specified.”72  Others noted that it was “not possible”73  to separate 
 
64. See Mass. Const. art. XV (“In all controversies concerning property, 
and in all suits between two or more persons, except in cases in which it 
has heretofore been otherways used and practiced, the parties have a 
right to trial by jury . . . .”). 
65. N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XLI.  
66. See, e.g., N.C. Const. of 1837, sec. 14 (“[I]n all controversies at law, 
respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best 
securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and 
inviolable.”). 
67. See Shannon C. Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law 
48–49 (1990) (discussing Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York as 
states where juries decided both law and fact). 
68. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 83, at 423–24 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(noting the numerous differences in trial practice among the states). 
69. See William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John 
Marshall’s Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 893, 904 
(1978) (“[E]quitable actions . . . were nonexistent in some colonies and 
narrowly limited in the rest . . . .”). 
70. Stimson, supra note 67, at 56. 
71. Wolfram, supra note 7, at 658–60 (quoting the Records of the 
Constitutional Convention). 
72. Id. at 659. 
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equity cases from common law cases and that the practices of the 
states’ courts were different.74 This limited record might appear to 
suggest that the civil jury right was not considered fundamental. The 
context in which it was discussed, however, is revealing. In an 
attempt to ensure constitutional recognition of the civil jury right, 
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved to add a bill of rights.75 
Rather than the right to freedom of speech, it was the lack of a civil 
jury right that prompted the first discussions to amend the Consti-
tution. This shows just how important the civil jury right was to the 
drafters. Unsurprising, however, were the protests of the other mem-
bers of the delegation that it would be too difficult to draft appropri-
ate language to protect the civil jury right.76 
Of course, Gerry’s proposal failed, and the Constitution initially 
lacked a bill of rights. Absent stronger protections of rights, it faced 
criticism from Antifederalists. A significant portion of this criticism 
was directed at the lack of protection for civil jury trials.77 This cri-
tique prompted a response from Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 
Paper No. 83.78 There, Hamilton remarked that the states had highly 
divergent views on the civil jury right, making it difficult to craft a 
satisfactory amendment.79 But, ultimately, the Antifederalist desire 
for juries “to guard against unwise legislation” and protection against 
“non-jury proceedings” carried the day.80 
Once again, the debate over what language would be sufficient to 
protect the civil jury right arose. James Madison proposed a version 
of what is now the Seventh Amendment that contained only a provi-
 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 660. 
75. Id. at 657 (“It is . . . somewhat incongruous to a twentieth-century 
reader to learn that the entire issue of the absence of a bill of rights was 
precipitated at the Philadelphia Convention by an objection that the 
document under consideration lacked a specific guarantee of jury trial in 
civil cases.”). 
76. Id. at 659–60. 
77. See The Federalist No. 83, supra note 68, at 418 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“The objection to the plan of the convention, which has met 
with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other 
States, is that relative to the want of a constitutional provision for the 
trial by jury in civil cases.”). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 424–25. 
80. Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s 
Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
183, 186 (2000). 
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sion preventing reexamination of facts determined by a jury.81 That 
version did not gain much traction, however, as it failed to address 
the complaint that the federal courts would operate without juries in 
civil cases. The House of Representatives eventually passed seventeen 
amendments, one of which read as follows: “In suits at common law, 
the right of trial by Jury shall be preserved.”82 The Senate pared 
down the list of amendments and added the amount-in-controversy 
requirement to the civil jury right.83 It was the Senate’s version that 
was submitted to, and approved by, the states. 
Given the pressure to include a bill of rights with a civil jury 
provision, it is no surprise that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had a broad 
provision for the right to a jury. The First Congress was drafting the 
Judiciary Act and Bill of Rights simultaneously, and the Act came 
into effect just days before the Bill of Rights passed through 
Congress.84 During the debate over the act, vocal opponents of the 
equity courts “describe[d] the evils of the chancery system in Eng-
land.”85 The Act required trial by jury in all circuit court cases “ex-
cept those of equity, and of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction.”86 
Applying this definition to the Seventh Amendment, it seems 
possible that the phrase “suits at common law” means those cases 
which are not suits of equity, admiralty, or maritime jurisdiction. 
This approach would be similar to the approach, noted above, in the 
Constitution of Massachusetts which restricted civil trials without a 
jury based on prior practice. Such an interpretation is consistent with 
the demonstrated importance of the civil jury right to the drafters, 
especially the vocal Antifederalists. This interpretation would, in 
effect, require a jury in all civil cases except those that had previously 
proceeded without juries. The implications of this interpretation will 
be explored below. 
 
81. Richard Labunski, James Madison and the Struggle for the 
Bill of Rights 267 (2006) (containing Madison’s proposed amend-
ments to the Constitution in Appendix I). 
82. Id. at 274. 
83. Id. at 276. 
84. The Judiciary Act was signed into law on Sept. 24, 1789. Congress 
passed the final version of the Bill of Rights one day later, on Sept. 25, 
1789. 
85. Wilfred J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789: Exposing Myths, Challenging Premises, and Using New 
Evidence 176–77 (1990) (describing the debate in Congress over the 
scope of equitable jurisdiction). 
86. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 80 (1789). Section 9 of 
that act also provided that, in the district courts, all issues of fact would 
be determined by jury except in admiralty and maritime cases. 
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II. The Limitations of the Current Application 
of the Historical Test 
A. Reconciling the Historical Record with the Historical Test 
As currently applied, the historical test requires some adjustment. 
A court faced with a Seventh Amendment issue looks to the nature of 
the action and the remedy sought.87 Of those two factors, the remedy 
sought is the more important.88 The right does apply to statutory 
actions created by Congress,89 but the Supreme Court has recognized 
an explicit exception for those cases where “public rights” are at 
issue.90 These public rights are created when Congress exercises its 
Article I powers.91 If Congress puts these cases in federal court, the 
Seventh Amendment guarantees a civil jury. 92  But Congress may 
move these cases to a non–Article III forum, which does not use a 
jury.93 
One concern about the application of the test is its focus on both 
the nature of the case and the remedy. At least one commentator has 
proposed that the test focuses exclusively on the remedy sought.94 In  
87. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters, & Helpers v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 
(1990) (“[W]e examine both the nature of the issues involved and the 
remedy sought.”).  
88. Id. (“The second inquiry is the more important in our analysis.”). 
89. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) (“This analysis 
applies not only to common-law forms of action, but also to causes of 
action created by congressional enactment.”). 
90. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 
430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977). 
91. Id. at 452 (“Familiar illustrations of administrative agencies created for 
the determination of such matters are found in connection with the 
exercise of the congressional power as to interstate and foreign 
commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the 
facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to veterans.”). 
92. Id. at 455 (stating that when Congress chooses to place a case in federal 
court rather than in an administrative agency, “‘it must preserve to 
parties their right to a jury trial’”). 
93. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 (1989) (“If . . . a 
party is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment, we must 
decide whether Congress may assign and has assigned resolution of the 
relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that does not use a 
jury as factfinder.”). 
94. Suja A. Thomas, A Limitation on Congress: “In Suits at Common 
Law,” 71 Ohio St. L.J. 1071, 1071 (2010) (“This two-prong examina-
tion has occurred despite the fact that whether a jury heard a claim in 
England in 1791 was based, with very few exceptions, only on the 
second prong—the relief sought, with damages being heard by 
juries. . . . The inquiry as to whether a jury trial right exists under the 
Seventh Amendment should be based only on the relief sought . . . .”). 
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practice, the Court has focused more of the analysis on the remedy 
sought, likely because there is a clearer line between those remedies 
available at common law and those in equity.95 But as the Court has 
noted, some remedies are not exclusively equitable or legal, requiring 
a renewed focus on the nature of the case.96 In cases involving restitu-
tion, both a legal and equitable remedy, the “more important” prong 
is essentially made redundant. 
Additionally, there is the crucial question of exactly what 
historical record a court should investigate. The Supreme Court has 
stated that the historical record is English common law as it existed 
in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified. Even assuming that the 
amendment meant to refer only to the common law of England, there 
is some doubt about the scope of the jury right in that system.97 The 
nature of a common law system is that of continual, albeit slow, 
change, and recent historical scholarship has suggested that American 
courts have not accurately followed the English common law system.98 
Further, there is some reason to doubt that the Seventh 
Amendment was meant to reflect only the historical practices of 
England. As Professor Wolfram noted, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the amendment was intended to model the federal courts 
after the states in which they sat.99 But that interpretation would 
carry great difficulty, as it would allow for forum shopping.100 Indeed, 
had that been the original meaning of the amendment, there would 
likely have been even stronger Antifederalist arguments against it.101  
95. Cf. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 217 
(2002) (“Rarely will there be need for any more ‘antiquarian in-
quiry,’ . . . than consulting, as we have done, standard current works 
such as Dobbs, Palmer, Corbin, and the Restatements, which make the 
[distinction between equitable and legal remedies] clear.” (citation 
omitted)). 
96. Id. at 214–15 (noting that restitution was available both at law and in 
equity). 
97. See Oldham, supra note 34, at 15 (suggesting that the right to a civil 
jury trial was broader in English courts than American courts have 
suggested). 
98. Id. (“The Seventh Amendment historical test has become an American 
legal fiction in application, since many more things were lodged with 
juries in England in 1791 than modern American courts . . . are pre-
pared to acknowledge.”). 
99. Wolfram, supra note 7, at 732–34 (discussing the interpretation that a 
federal court looks to the state in which it sits for guidance on the scope 
of the civil jury right). 
100. See id. at 733–34 (discussing the difficulties of implementing this test). 
101. Cf. Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 228–29 
(1999) (noting that objections to the lack of an explicit guarantee of a 
civil jury right included fears that “the federal courts would ‘supersede 
the state courts’”). 
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It is unlikely that an amendment that allowed for inconsistency 
between federal courts in the states would have passed. 
Another suggested reading is that the right should be applied 
consistently, but only to the extent provided in the most narrowly 
interpreting state at the amendment’s adoption.102 The wide variation 
in state jury rights cuts against this argument; it is unlikely that 
citizens of Pennsylvania, where the right was quite broad, would have 
agreed to narrow their federal rights to the level of a state like New 
York, which generally followed English practice.103 
The historical record reveals that the Seventh Amendment does 
incorporate, at least to some extent, the experiences of the early 
American courts.104 Through these experiences as colonies and early 
states, the American court system had developed a stronger 
preference for jury trials than English law. The question is this: to 
what extent do the disparate states’ practices affect the analysis? 
Simply put, there are inherent difficulties in a right that would vary 
in each state. Taking a more global view of the civil jury right as it 
existed in 1791 offers the advantage of avoiding the specific idiosync-
rasies of each state. This broader view requires looking at the history-
ical experiences of the American states collectively. Colonists had 
objected to laws removing cases to equity and admiralty courts, which 
operated without juries. And where England sought to subject jurors 
to control by judges, American colonists pushed back by encouraging 
juror participation and nullification as an important feature of 
democratic society. The civil jury right was considered so essential 
that its exclusion at the Constitutional Convention prompted the first 
proposal to add a bill of rights. 
In light of these experiences, the phrase “suits at common law” 
was meant to denote those suits not in admiralty, equity, or some 
other specialized type of proceeding. Rather than freeze the right to a 
jury trial only in those cases where a jury would have been impaneled, 
the amendment instead limits the expansion of equity and admiralty 
jurisdiction in order to protect against encroachment on the civil jury 
right.105 
 
102. See Kenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the 
“Historical Test” for Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 Neb. L. 
Rev. 467, 487 (2010) (“[T]he point of reference would be the sphere of 
responsibility of the chancery courts in the broadest of the then-existing 
state systems.”). 
103. Compare Pa. Const. of 1776, art. XI (requiring jury trial in all civil 
cases), with N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. XLI (following English practice). 
104. See Wolfram, supra note 7, at 734 (“[T]he geographical element of the 
historical test—the reference to England—is relatively unimportant and 
can be disregarded.”). 
105. The Supreme Court has recognized that the Seventh Amendment 
applies to causes of action created by Congress as well as traditional 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Preserving the Civil Jury Right 
445 
Taking the view that the Seventh Amendment was meant to limit 
civil cases without juries, the public rights exception becomes difficult 
to maintain, at least as it is currently formulated. If the amendment 
requires civil juries in new forms of action, on what grounds is the 
public rights exception founded? A review of the exception’s develop-
ment is useful for purposes of this analysis. 
B. The Public Rights Exception’s Development 
The exception allowing Congress to place certain cases in non-
judicial forums that did not use juries was first recognized in 1855, in 
the case of Murray’s Lessee.106 In that case, the plaintiff and defen-
dant claimed title to the same land. The defendant had purchased the 
land after the Treasury Department placed liens on the land to collect 
money owed by a former customs director.107 The crucial issue was the 
validity of the lien placed on the property by the Treasury Depart-
ment. The plaintiff claimed that the property owner could not be 
denied his right to his property without the intervention of the judic-
iary. The Court found that, while Article III did require suits to be 
handled by the judicial branch, “there are matters, involving public 
rights, which may be presented in such form that the judicial power is 
capable of acting on them . . . but which congress may or may not 
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United 
States . . . .”108 The Court did not elaborate on the precise definition 
of a public right but did give an example: the recognition of property 
rights in ceded territories.109 The Court did not consider whether the 
Seventh Amendment had any effect on the analysis; rather, the Court 
spent the majority of the opinion discussing Article III and the Due 
Process Clause.110 
The public rights exception expanded in the 1930s, with Crowell 
v. Benson.111 This expansion was a reaction to the growing use of 
 
common-law causes of action. See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 
412, 417 (1987). The development of the public rights exception has 
restricted this idea from reaching its ultimate end. See infra Part II.B.  
106. Murray’s Lessee et al. v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 
(18 How.) 272 (1855). 
107. Id. at 274. 
108. Id. at 284. 
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 276–86. The Court did mention the Seventh Amendment in 
passing, but the bulk of the opinion deals with whether a judicial 
process is required for “due process of law” in this instance. The Court 
ultimately determined that it did not. Id. at 280–81.  
111. 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding that because the claims are governed by 
maritime law and within admiralty jurisdiction, the Seventh Amend-
ment does not require a trial by jury).  
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administrative agencies to carry out government functions.112 Congress 
had begun to create agencies that operated with additional autonomy 
and expertise in promulgating regulations and deciding important 
issues. Congress granted these agencies the power to find facts and 
settle some disputes. Although contemporary commentators agreed 
that these agencies were constitutional, it was unclear to what extent 
Article III and the Seventh Amendment right to a civil jury applied 
to agency proceedings.113 
Although it was a maritime case, Crowell set the stage for later 
judicial consideration of the public rights exception and 
administrative agencies.114 In that case, the law at issue suggested 
that the factual findings of the deputy commissioner would be 
considered final.115 The Court held that administrative findings within 
the agency’s “proper sphere” would be final, with district courts able 
to review only those factual findings outside the scope of expertise of 
the agency.116 The Court noted that the legislative intent had been 
“to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for 
dealing with a class of questions of fact” properly suited for 
examination by experts.117 The Court had taken the first, but by no 
means the last, step of deferring findings of fact to administrative 
agencies. 
Several years later, the Court explicitly recognized an exception 
for administrative proceedings in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp.118 The case centered on an NLRB finding that a corporation 
had violated the National Labor Relations Act of 1935119 by discrimin-
ating against union members. 120  The corporation challenged the 
Board’s ruling, in part, by arguing that the Act violated Article III 
 
112. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Admini-
strative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1671–76 (1975) (describing the 
growth of administrative law alongside regulation of railroads and other 
industries since the turn of the century). 
113. See generally Cases and Other Materials on Administrative Law 
(Felix Frankfurter & J. Forrester Davison eds., 1932) (surveying the 
early development of administrative law and providing for its constitu-
tionality). 
114. See Young, supra note 33, at 779 (“What survives of Crowell . . . is its 
conclusion that non-Article III tribunals can be used extensively by 
Congress to finally determine most facts . . . .”).  
115. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46. 
116. Id. at 64–65. 
117. Id. at 46. 
118. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
119. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935). 
120. 301 U.S. at 22. 
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and the Seventh Amendment. The Court found that a statutory cause 
of action was not in the nature of a suit at common law, and thus 
there was no right to a civil jury.121 On those grounds, the Court held 
that the amendment did not apply, and the finding by the Board was 
constitutional.  
Where Crowell dealt with the scope of Article III, Atlas Roofing 
Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission122 similarly 
“lowered the . . . seventh amendment barrier . . . as to the per-
missibility of agency adjudication under article III.” 123  In Atlas 
Roofing, the Court took up the issue of whether Congress could 
require enforcement of statutory causes of action in administrative 
proceedings “where there is no jury trial.”124 The Court found that 
when Congress created “new statutory ‘public rights,’” it could 
permissibly create quasi-adjudicative administrative agencies that did 
not use juries.125 Again, the Court noted policy considerations, stating 
that “Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke 
the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation.”126 
The Court has not set a firm boundary for the public rights 
exception, however, and Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co.,127 a bankruptcy proceeding, revealed a split 
in the Court. The plurality opinion declined to define a public right 
but noted that it “must at a minimum arise ‘between the government 
and others.’” 128  The four Justices who signed onto the plurality 
opinion also said, however, that the public rights exception was 
historically based on the distinction between judicial matters and 
those that the Executive and Legislative branches could resolve 
 
121. Id. at 48–49. Note that this justification was not accepted in later Court 
opinions. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974) (“[W]e have 
considered the applicability of the constitutional right to jury trial in 
actions enforcing statutory rights ‘as a matter too obvious to be 
doubted.’” (quoting Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir. 
1972)). 
122. 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
123. Young, supra note 33, at 846. 
124. 430 U.S. at 444. 
125. Id. at 454–55. 
126. Id. at 455 (“This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have 
required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a 
federal court of law instead of an administrative agency.”). It is worth 
noting that the Atlas Roofing Court also called into question the then-
recent decision of Curtis, by stating that “[the Seventh Amendment] 
thus did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required 
before.” Id. at 459. 
127. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
128. Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
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internally.129 This distinction seemed to intertwine the scope of Article 
III with the Seventh Amendment.130 
The Court later explicitly stated that the Article III and Seventh 
Amendment analyses were one and the same in Granfinanciera, S.A. 
v. Nordberg.131 In Granfinanciera, the Court upheld the view that the 
Government need not be a party to a case for it to involve public 
rights.132 Rather, the Court defined a public right as a statutory right 
closely intertwined with a federal regulatory scheme.133 If a statutory 
right is not closely intertwined with a regulatory scheme, then the 
Seventh Amendment requires a civil jury. The Court also held that 
the plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline did not control.134 
The Granfinanciera definition of a public right was recently 
upheld in Stern v. Marshall.135 In Stern, the central issue was whether 
a bankruptcy judge could constitutionally resolve a counterclaim.136 In 
a 5–4 decision, the majority reaffirmed that a public right is a 
statutory right arising from a federal regulatory scheme. 137  The 
majority conceded, however, that the Court’s previous discussion of 
the public rights exception “has not been entirely consistent, and the 
exception has been the subject of some debate . . . .”138 
After some splits in the Court and vacillating decisions, the public 
rights exception has been established. The definition has expanded, 
 
129. Id. at 68 (citing Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 458). 
130. See Martin H. Redish & Daniel J. La Fave, Seventh Amendment Right 
to Jury Trial in Non-Article III Proceedings: A Study in Dysfunctional 
Constitutional Theory, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 407, 421–27 
(1995) (arguing that the Court has wrongly combined the two separate 
concepts). 
131. 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989) (“Indeed, our decisions point to the conclusion 
that, if a statutory cause of action is legal in nature, the question 
whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to assign its 
adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as factfinders 
requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows 
Congress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article 
III tribunal.”). 
132. Id. at 54. 
133. Id. at 54–55. 
134. Id. at 54 (discussing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 
458 U.S. 50 (1982)). 
135. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
136. Id. at 2600. 
137. Id. at 2613. 
138. Id. at 2611. Justice Scalia signed on to the majority opinion but wrote a 
concurrence to express his view that a public right should be one arising 
between the government and a private party. Id. at 2620–21 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 65·Issue 2·2014 
Preserving the Civil Jury Right 
449 
but it requires a narrow view of the Seventh Amendment’s scope. The 
Court has read “suits at common law” to include only those suits 
required in federal court by Article III. In so doing, the Court has 
combined the Article III and Seventh Amendment analysis.139 But 
while Congress may permissibly provide for adjudication in “legisla-
tive courts,” the Court has not offered a consistent rationale for 
omitting the civil jury right from these proceedings. The practical 
realities of the situation may explain the Court’s reluctance to do 
so—the growth of administrative agencies requires due consideration 
and care.140 If the Court were to require civil juries in all administra-
tive proceedings, it would likely cause significant gridlock as agencies 
attempted to adapt their practices and accommodate jurors. 
All the same, accepting the position that the Seventh Amendment 
was intended to apply to new forms of action, it is difficult to 
reconcile the amendment’s purpose with its current form, which 
applies only to those actions taking place in the federal courts. The 
remainder of this Note puts forward a proposal that attempts to 
recognize the implications of the civil jury right, while attempting to 
mitigate some of the inefficiency that would necessarily arise from a 
broader right to a civil jury than has been previously recognized. 
III. Proposing a New Test for the  
Seventh Amendment’s Scope 
A. The New Test—What It Is and What It Covers 
The difficulties inherent in the combination of the Article III and 
Seventh Amendment analyses have been well dissected by commen-
tators.141 The two provisions of the Constitution should be dealt with 
separately. The difficulty in extending the current test, however, has 
led many to concede that some additional constitutional uniformity is 
 
139. See, e.g., Redish & La Fave, supra note 130, at 409 (“In . . . admini-
strative adjudications and enforcement proceedings as well as actions 
brought before non-Article III ‘legislative’ courts, the Supreme Court 
has all but abandoned the Seventh Amendment right . . . .”). 
140. For an excellent analysis of the difficulties with the current test and the 
problems facing an expansion of the Seventh Amendment, see Ellen E. 
Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amendment, 
77 N.C. L. Rev. 1037 (1999). 
141. See, e.g., Redish & La Fave, supra note 130, at 409 (“In . . . admini-
strative adjudications and enforcement proceedings as well as actions 
brought before non-Article III ‘legislative’ courts, the Supreme Court 
has all but abandoned the Seventh Amendment right, even though there 
is absolutely no legitimate, principled basis on which to conclude that a 
jury trial right is somehow inapplicable to such proceedings.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Sward, supra note 140, at 1114 (“[T]here are good reasons for 
finding that the Constitution requires a jury trial regardless of the 
nature of the court in which the matter is pending.”). 
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not worth its cost in government efficiency.142 Concerns over expand-
ing the civil jury right have dissuaded both courts and scholars from 
announcing a broader standard.143 But, as the Court has previously 
announced, “the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient . . . 
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.”144 Given the 
difficulties in maintaining a joint Article III–Seventh Amendment 
analysis, it is time for the Court to decide not whether the civil jury 
right should be recognized, but how. While an alternative to the 
current analysis would require a shift in thinking, it is possible to 
strike a balance between the civil jury right and the status quo. 
Given the different attitudes across the states about the jury 
right, it is difficult to determine conclusively what exactly the 
amendment was meant to preserve. 145  But on the record that is 
available, it is possible to see the attitude toward and reasoning 
behind the Seventh Amendment. The amendment was put in place to 
prevent the expansion of suits in equity and admiralty, which would 
have reduced civil jury trials. The Constitution gave Congress the 
ability to determine federal court jurisdiction without providing any 
protection for the jury right. The argument against the Constitution’s 
original silence on the civil jury right was bottomed on the fear of new 
laws, similar to the Sugar and Stamp Acts, which would improperly 
remove cases to forums where the jury right was not recognized. As 
such, the Seventh Amendment was enacted to prevent the expansion 
of equitable actions, while maintaining congressional flexibility to 
create proper venues.146 
 
142. See Redish & La Fave, supra note 130, at 450–53 (proposing a means by 
which the Supreme Court could justify the current administrative 
arrangement); Sward, supra note 140, at 1043 (“I concede that 
maintaining the status quo, however weak its constitutional base, may 
be more pragmatic and therefore more attractive. Better the devil we 
know.”). 
143. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977) (“Congress is not required by the 
Seventh Amendment to choke the already crowded federal courts with 
new types of litigation or prevented from committing some new types of 
litigation to administrative agencies with special competence in the 
relevant field.”). 
144. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
145. Cf. Wolfram, supra note 7, at 652 (“The almost total absence of any 
record of debate in the Senate during its consideration of the Bill of 
Rights, if nothing else, should preclude one from believing that he has 
found the historical ‘key’ to resolution of any contemporary issue of 
seventh amendment constitutionalism.” (footnote omitted)). 
146. One current Justice has supported this position, albeit in the context of 
Article III analysis. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620–21 
(2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Leaving aside certain adjudications by 
federal administrative agencies, which are governed (for better or worse) 
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With the amendment’s purpose in mind, the public rights 
exception in its current form requires some changes. If the Court is to 
apply a historical test, as it should, then the distinction between 
private and public rights cannot provide an exception for the civil 
jury right. Such a distinction works in the Article III analysis but not 
the Seventh Amendment analysis. After all, the amendment’s purpose 
was to ensure that juries would continue to serve, even in new types 
of actions.147 The plurality in Northern Pipeline is correct, however, 
that there are some historical actions that must fall outside the scope 
of the Seventh Amendment. These actions include bankruptcy148 and 
tax levies.149 Thus, any analysis of the Seventh Amendment should 
recognize that these actions will not require jury trials. 
In order to be more consistent with the amendment’s scope and 
purpose, this Note proposes a new form of the historical test. A court 
should focus, as it currently does, on both the nature of the cause of 
action and the remedy sought. Unlike the current historical test, 
however, the remedy would not be the more important prong of the 
analysis.150 Rather, the nature of the case should be the dispositive 
factor. A court should consider the nature of the case in light of the 
more expansive jury right in the early days of the colonies, rather 
than English common law practice in 1791. Certainly there was a 
significant overlap between the two systems. The key distinction is 
the colonial attitude that the juryless practices of equity and 
admiralty should not be expanded. Under this test, the nature of the 
action can be dispositive. Further, if there was a historical analog in 
equity, admiralty, or another type of specialized practice that did not 
require a jury—like bankruptcy or tax levies—then the Seventh 
 
by our landmark decision in Crowell v. Benson, in my view an Article 
III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless there is a firmly 
established historical practice to the contrary.” (citation omitted)). 
147. See supra Part II.A. 
148. See generally Stephen J. Lubben, A New Understanding of the Bank-
ruptcy Clause, 64 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 319 (2014) (discussing the 
historical origins of bankruptcy proceedings). 
149. See The Federalist No. 83, supra note 68, at 422 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (“The taxes are usually levied by the more summary proceed-
ing of distress and sale. . . . And it is acknowledged on all hands, that 
this is essential to the efficacy of the revenue laws.”). 
150. Allowing the remedy sought to become the deciding factor in the 
analysis misses the point that the distinction between remedies in courts 
of law and courts of equity was one of procedure rather than substance. 
See Blackstone, supra note 39, at *436 (“[The difference] principally 
consists in the different modes of administering justice in each; in the 
mode of proof, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief.”). If the civil 
jury right is to be properly enforced, the remedy sought should not 
control the outcome. 
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Amendment does not guarantee any jury right. If there is no clear 
historical analog and the remedy was not traditionally equitable, then 
the Seventh Amendment does guarantee a jury right.151 
This would have a significant effect on the public rights except-
ion, to be sure. Rather than consider the exception in cases like 
bankruptcy, as the Court has previously done,152 this new test would 
recognize the historical nature of bankruptcy courts as outside the 
scope of the Seventh Amendment. By recognizing the inapplicability 
of the Seventh Amendment to these unique actions, the new historical 
test simplifies the analysis in this regard. 
In the situation discussed by the Northern Pipeline plurality,153 
where the executive or legislative branch acts in a way that does not 
implicate judicial oversight, the amendment would not apply. But 
such a situation is already kept out of federal courts by the basic 
principle that purely political lawsuits are not allowed.154 It is not a 
justification for keeping the Seventh Amendment out of administra-
tive adjudications, which could have been located in the federal court 
system if Congress so desired. 
One significant impact of this reworking would be on administra-
tive adjudications, which currently receive the public rights exception. 
This test would apply whether a case is presented before an Article III 
tribunal. It would not, however, alter the forum. Thus, a civil jury 
right would apply in many agency proceedings previously covered by 
the public rights exception.155  
One of the most common arguments in favor of omitting the civil 
jury has been one of efficiency. The Supreme Court has stated that  
151. This is in keeping with the Court’s determination in Curtis v. Loether, 
415 U.S. 189 (1974), that a statutory cause of action does implicate the 
Seventh Amendment right, even when it was not the sort of action 
found at common law in 1791. 
152. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011) (finding that a 
counterclaim fell outside the public rights exception, and therefore could 
not be heard in a bankruptcy court). 
153. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 
(1982) (“The public-rights doctrine is grounded in a historically 
recognized distinction between matters that could be conclusively 
determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches and matters that 
are ‘inherently . . . judicial.’” (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 
U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). 
154. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) 
(“[W]hatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which 
executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no 
power to control that discretion. The subjects are political.” (alteration 
in original)). 
155. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (employee safety); NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (labor relations). 
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“Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke the 
already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation.”156 And as 
Alexander Hamilton noted in the Federalist Papers, requiring a court 
case for every revenue collection would be a wasteful exercise.157 But 
revenue cases existed without a jury long before the Seventh Amend-
ment, so the historical analysis will not alter the status quo.158 Fur-
ther, the Seventh Amendment’s preservation of the jury right need 
not require the district courts to have jurisdiction over the cases. It 
means merely that the jury right applies regardless of whether the 
case is brought in a federal court. 
This test would have a significant impact on a number of 
administrative proceedings.159 It is important, then, to note what this 
interpretation would not do. The Court’s distinction between sub-
stance and procedure would remain intact, allowing for motions to 
dismiss160 and for summary judgment161 to remain an important part 
of federal procedure. Similarly, a new understanding of the amend-
ment’s scope does not impact decisions like Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc.,162 where the Court separated questions of law from 
questions of fact in the specific context of patent litigation. Nor would 
this interpretation require juries to determine all factual issues in 
federal court; cases with historical similarities to equity and admiralty 
would continue unaffected. The test proposed here would not alter 
these established principles. 
 
156. Atlas Roofing Co., 430 U.S. at 455. 
157. The Federalist No. 83, supra note 68, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(“[The omission of juries] is essential to the efficacy of the revenue 
laws.”). 
158. See Roger W. Kirst, Administrative Penalties and the Civil Jury: The 
Supreme Court’s Assault on the Seventh Amendment, 126 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1281, 1294–95 (1978) (“The typical eighteenth century collection 
procedure . . . was nonjudicial and did not involve the courts at any 
stage from assessment to collection.”). 
159. Cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932) (“Familiar illustrations of 
administrative agencies . . . are found in connection with . . . interstate 
and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the public lands, public 
health, the facilities of the post office, pensions and payments to 
veterans.”). 
160. But see Kenneth S. Klein, Ashcroft v. Iqbal Crashes Rule 8 Pleading 
Standards on to Unconstitutional Shores, 88 Neb. L. Rev. 261 (2009) 
(arguing that heightened pleading standards violate the Seventh 
Amendment). 
161. But see Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Unconstitutional, 
93 Va. L. Rev. 139 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment is 
unconstitutional because no such procedure existed in eighteenth-
century common law). 
162. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
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B. Implementing the New Test and Maintaining Efficient Proceedings 
If it is accepted that the civil jury right would apply to admini-
strative adjudication, this raises some serious questions: how would a 
jury be involved, and what type of a jury? Administrative 
proceedings, after all, are valued both for their efficiency and expertise 
in finding certain facts. Adding a lay jury into the process could 
undermine both values. Indeed, these practical concerns have 
convinced scholars that administrative proceedings should involve no 
jury right.163 The remainder of this Note argues, however, that these 
justifications are not as strong as they might initially appear and that 
a civil jury could be incorporated into administrative adjudications. 
There are two ways to involve a jury in these actions. First, a 
jury could be the finder of fact at the initial administrative hearing. 
Second, when a court reviews an appeal from an administrative 
decision, there might be a means by which a jury could be used. 
Impanelling a jury on appeal would likely prove difficult. 
Administrative decisions are not uniform in their appeals processes. 
Some decisions are reviewed in the district courts,164 while others are 
heard in the appellate courts.165 This disparity would make uniform 
application of an appellate jury right impossible. Additionally, invol-
ving a jury at the appellate stage would require, at least to some 
degree, two levels of fact-finding—hardly an efficient solution. For 
these reasons, the more practical solution would be to involve a jury 
at the initial stages of the process but adapt it for an administrative 
proceeding. 
It may appear inconsistent to suggest both that a civil jury right 
must apply and that the right should be tailored to fit the administra-
tive process. But the Due Process Clause has applied to parties in 
agency adjudication (at least in some cases) for almost as long as 
those proceedings have existed.166 And the Supreme Court has already 
 
163. See, e.g., Redish & La Fave, supra note 130, at 450–52 (noting 
inconsistency in the Court’s Seventh Amendment jurisprudence and 
proposing an alternative ground on which to exclude the civil jury right 
from non–Article III adjudication); Sward, supra note 140, at 1141–42 
(discussing difficulties with incorporating the civil jury right into non–
Article III proceedings and proposing a choice between forums). 
164. See, e.g., Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1977) (finding that 
the amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 conferred jurisdiction on the 
district courts, subject to any “preclusion-of-review statutes”). 
165. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. Abraham, 355 F.3d 179, 193 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (noting that Congress may opt for administrative appeals to 
be placed in the appellate courts); Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. 
FAA, 998 F.2d 1523, 1528 (10th Cir. 1993) (finding that the FAA Act 
granted jurisdiction to the Courts of Appeals). 
166. See, e.g., Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908) (holding that 
due process of law applies to administrative taxing procedures). But see 
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provided a model for the incorporation of constitutional rights into 
administrative law, with its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
1. The Fourth Amendment and Administrative Inspections 
Administrative agencies began earnestly developing “in the latter 
part of the nineteenth century.”167 This development occurred well 
before the Court reconsidered the scope of the Fourth Amendment.168 
As such, the Court initially held that the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirement did not apply in situations where a state 
regulatory agency was conducting an inspection for violation of city 
health ordinances.169 The Court reasoned that, because the search at 
issue was an administrative inspection rather than a search for 
criminal wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment offered no protection.170 
In dicta, the Court noted that were a search warrant to be required 
for an administrative inspection, it would need to fit the “rigorous 
constitutional restrictions” that applies to all search warrants.171 The 
issue was contentious—four justices dissented, arguing that the war-
ant requirement did not apply only to “mere criminal prosecutions.”172 
Because it was concerned about unduly burdening regulatory agencies 
and officials, the majority declined to require a warrant for admini-
strative inspections. 
The next time the Court considered warrantless administrative 
searches, it changed course. In Camara v. Municipal Court of San 
Francisco,173 the Court overruled Frank, holding that the warrant 
requirement did extend to administrative searches.174 The Court noted 
 
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894–
96 (1961) (finding, five decades after Londoner, that due process applied 
when a woman was denied an “opportunity to work” on a military 
base).  
167. See Stewart, supra note 112, at 1671 (noting that administrative 
agencies began a robust period of growth to regulate growing businesses 
like the railroads). 
168. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment protection may extend to “what [a person] seeks to 
preserve as private”). 
169. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (5–4 decision). 
170. Id. at 367 (“Inspection without a warrant, as an adjunct to a regulatory 
scheme . . . and not as a means of enforcing the criminal law, has 
antecedents deep in our history.”). 
171. Id. at 373. 
172. Id. at 377 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
173. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
174. Id. at 534 (“[A]dministrative searches of the kind at issue here are 
significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
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that an administrative warrant need not be based on probable cause 
of finding a violation, but could issue when “a valid public interest 
justifies the intrusion contemplated.”175 That same day, the Court also 
decided See v. City of Seattle.176 In that case, the Court held that 
commercial premises were also protected against warrantless admini-
strative searches.177 The Court noted that the warrant requirement 
would be a “minimal limitation[] on administrative action.”178  
Although these cases established that administrative inspections 
required a warrant, the issue was far from settled. In dissent, three 
justices argued that adding a warrant requirement would cause 
“enormous confusion” for regulators.179 The dissenters noted the mul-
titude of administrative inspections across the nation and expressed 
concern that a new warrant requirement would jeopardize these 
inspections.180 Practical concerns, as well as historical practice, seemed 
to favor warrantless administrative inspections. 
The Court did consider these practical concerns in subsequent 
cases. As a result, it developed an exception to the warrant 
requirement for heavily regulated industries. In Colonnade Catering 
Corp. v. United States,181 the Court held that a warrantless search 
was permissible because it involved alcohol—an “industry long subject 
to close supervision and inspection.”182 Because of that long history of 
regulation, “Congress has broad authority to fashion standards of 
reasonableness for searches and seizures” 183  relating to the liquor 
industry. Later cases applied this exception to other heavily regulated 
industries, like firearms 184  and mining. 185  But the Court did not 
hesitate to strike down a statute that would have granted authority 
 
175. Id. at 539. 
176. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).  
177. Id. at 545.  
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 547 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
180. Id. at 551 (“In the larger metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, over 
300,000 inspections (health and fire) revealed over 28,000 hazardous 
violations.”). 
181. 397 U.S. 72 (1970). 
182. Id. at 77. 
183. Id. 
184. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (upholding an 
inspection of a firearms dealer because the inspection was “undeniably of 
central importance” to the entire regulatory scheme). 
185. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (“[T]he warrantless 
inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act do not offend 
the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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to search “any factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or 
other area”186 as overly broad.187 
This reasoning could be applied to the Seventh Amendment. For 
efficiency reasons, the Fourth Amendment protection against warrant-
less search and seizure was initially inapplicable to administrative 
agencies.188 But the Court soon reconsidered, finding that a warrant 
requirement would not unduly impair administrative agencies. Yet the 
Court did recognize that administrative searches differed from crimi-
nal investigations. By allowing for the “closely regulated industry” 
exception, the Court balanced the efficiency concerns of agencies with 
the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
Thus, the precedent for incorporating additional requirements into 
administrative law has been set. If the Court decides that the civil 
jury right applies in non–Article III adjudication, it need not adopt 
the right as it pertains to federal district courts. Rather, a tailored 
civil jury could be employed to maintain the benefits of administra-
tive adjudication. 
2. Tailoring the Civil Jury Right to Fit Administrative Adjudication 
Administrative adjudications are generally more efficient than fed-
eral litigation. 189  That is undoubtedly a factor in why Congress 
established agency adjudication in many regulatory areas.190 In order 
to maintain the benefits of the process, whatever jury right is added 
to the proceeding will need to fit within the existing process in a way 
that does not unduly burden agencies or the parties. It is important 
to note, however, that the use of a jury in civil cases also implicates 
significant values. In addition to giving members of the public some 
power to decide cases,191 jurors tend to have a more favorable view of 
 
186. Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 309 n.1 (1978) (quoting the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1598, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 657(a) (1970) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (2012))). 
187. Id. at 313 (noting that warrantless administrative searches have only 
been upheld in “relatively unique circumstances”). That case relied on 
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce; but this general 
regulatory authority was not sufficient to allow warrantless searches. 
188. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959) (noting that city 
inspections would be “greatly hobbled” by the requirements of obtaining 
a warrant). 
189. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative 
Procedure, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 258, 279 (1978) (noting that 
administrative proceedings are intended to be “efficient and low-cost”). 
190. See, e.g., Sward, supra note 140, at 1044 (noting that administrative 
agencies handle significantly more cases each year than federal courts). 
191. See supra notes 60–62 and accompanying text. 
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the judicial system after serving.192 It is reasonable to expect that if 
administrative agencies began using juries in adjudications, the jurors 
might also come away with a greater understanding of the 
administrative process.193 
One of the main objections to jury involvement in administrative 
adjudication has been to keep the proceedings efficient.194 While incor-
porating a jury might slow down the process, it could be tailored to 
preserve only the “substance” of the right.195 After all, the Court has 
shown with its administrative search cases that allowing for some 
concessions for administrative functionality is perfectly compatible 
with maintaining a constitutional right. The Court must find a 
balance between administrative efficiency and the essential substance 
of the right. 
That raises this question: what is the substance of the civil jury 
right? A jury brings the community’s values and knowledge to the 
case; as such, the jury pool would still need to “be drawn from a 
source fairly representative of the community.”196 A full jury of twelve 
is not necessary to preserve the substance of the right.197 A smaller 
jury would suffice, so long as the jury pool fairly reflects the 
community and can effectively deliberate. The Court would likely find 
that a minimum number of six jurors was required.198  
 
192. See Sward, supra note 140, at 1111 (“[S]tudies have shown that citizens 
who have served on juries have considerably more respect for the 
judicial system after their service than they had before.”). 
193. Cf. Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for 
Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen 
Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 Admin. L. Rev. 611, 627 
(2013) (“[P]ublic participation can both enhance the quality of agency 
decisionmaking and imbue citizens with a sense of investedness in the 
workings of the administrative state.”). 
194. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (noting that 
Congress intended to provide a “prompt, continuous, expert and 
inexpensive” alternative to trial in federal court). But see David J. 
Arkush, Direct Republicanism in the Administrative Process, 81 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 1458, 1501–03 (2013) (arguing that administrative 
juries could be employed in ways that minimize costs). 
195. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996) 
(noting that only the “substance” of the common-law right must be 
preserved to satisfy the analysis). 
196. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363 (1979) (quoting Taylor v. 
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975)). 
197. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 48(a) (allowing for as few as six jurors in a district 
court case); see also Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973) (“[W]e 
think it cannot be said that 12 members is a substantive aspect of the 
right of trial by jury.”). 
198. The Supreme Court has determined that the Constitution requires a 
minimum of six jurors in criminal cases. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 
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Using a different juror procedure could also mitigate a loss of 
efficiency. Rather than convene for each adjudication, the administra-
tive jury could be modeled after the grand jury system.199 Impanelling 
jurors for multiple actions would have some benefits. It would allow 
the jurors to develop some familiarity with any technical or legal 
complexities.200 Further, experience working within an agency would 
also give the jury the ability to make more thoughtful comments and 
decisions.201  
It is true that one of the features of a jury trial is to prevent 
“oppression by the Government,”202 but there are reasons to promote 
a civil jury trial beyond suspicion of governmental overreach. 
Allowing the community to express its values through verdicts and 
encouraging civic participation are just as valuable today as they were 
two hundred years ago. 203  Use of a jury in an administrative 
proceeding may be even more important now, given concerns about 
agency legitimacy and accountability.204 The right to a civil jury trial 
is as much a right of the community as it is the parties to the 
litigation.  
Conclusion 
If “suits at common law” is read to mean all suits not 
encompassing equity or admiralty, then the Seventh Amendment’s 
 
223, 239 (1978) (“[T]he assembled data raise substantial doubt about 
the reliability and appropriate representation of panels smaller than 
six.”). Because “progressively smaller juries are less likely to foster 
effective group deliberation,” a minimum of six jurors is desirable. Id. at 
232. 
199. See Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 
Admin. L. Rev. 465, 509–514 (1992) (proposing a grand jury system to 
oversee administrative adjudication and policymaking). 
200. Cf. id. at 514–17 (arguing that using advisors to educate the jury would 
allow for greater deliberation). 
201. See Arkush, supra note 194, at 1496–98 (proposing that administrative 
juries could make straightforward decisions or, alternatively, “provide 
open-ended suggestions, questions, or comments”). 
202. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). 
203. See, e.g., Langbein et al., supra note 37, at 484 (“[S]everal eminent 
American lawyers and statesmen contended that juries had the right—
not just the power—to decide the law as well as the facts in civil and 
criminal cases.”). 
204. See, e.g., Bull, supra note 193, at 614 (noting the “general anxiety” of 
American citizens that agencies are not directly accountable to voters); 
Wright, supra note 199, at 465 (“Although the government affects their 
lives profoundly, citizens interact with government agencies without any 
conviction that they could influence an outcome.”). 
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right to a civil jury reaches further than courts have previously 
recognized. In effect, it changes the focus of the historical test from 
common law cases in 1791 to those brought in equity. If a case was 
not previously subject to the jurisdiction of an equity or admiralty 
court, then the Seventh Amendment implicates some form of a jury 
right.  
The clearest implication of this view is that a right to a civil jury 
applies regardless of the forum. Thus, this view would have an impact 
on those administrative proceedings that are not analogous to cases in 
equity from 1791. This would require some reworking of current 
practice, to be sure. But the alternatives would be to either ignore the 
civil jury right’s scope or to amend the Constitution to limit the civil 
jury right to Article III proceedings. While neither choice would offer 
the benefits of a jury, the latter would at least acknowledge the 
importance of the Seventh Amendment. 
If the Court does decide to recognize the broader reach of the civil 
jury right, the jury at an administrative action need not be identical 
to a jury in a civil suit in federal court. The proceeding could be 
designed to incorporate a jury in the least disruptive manner. Some 
loss in efficiency may be inevitable, but it is a small price to pay for 
recognizing a constitutional right as such. 
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